Nevertheless, the United States does not appear to be in a position to capitalize on the aftermath of the Soleimani strike. Iranians are furious with their government, but their government continues to be willing to incarcerate and torture large numbers of them. And the theory of how disaffection within the Iranian public—over the downing of the airliner and so much more—leads to the overthrow of the current regime remains opaque at best.

Meanwhile, signs of trouble abound in the surrounding region. After the Soleimani attack, Iraq may revoke America’s right to keep troops in their country, or severely restrict the use of those forces, in ways that prevent their effectiveness in either fighting the Islamic State or containing Iranian behavior.

American allies around the Persian Gulf are fuming that the U.S. didn’t respond more forcefully to the attacks on Saudi Arabia and to neutral shipping, thereby raising questions about the value of our security guarantee. The administration’s preferred way to reassure these allies is to deploy military forces—14,000 more U.S. personnel have been sent to the Middle East since Trump was elected. But this approach is less meaningful, as military capability matters far less than the political willingness to use it on behalf of allies. Because the United States is seen as unreliable, what’s necessary to reassure these allies is getting more expensive.

In another worrisome sign, the only countries willing to join a U.S.-led maritime force in the Gulf have been Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. One indicator of the concern about American policy is that more U.S. allies have committed forces to a competing French-led European Union coalition.

The EU and the Trump administration are working at cross-purposes in other ways. The EU, which preferred Obama’s approach, went so far as to build a payment system that would allow global companies to circumvent dollar sanctions on Iran. That mechanism lies unused because businesses are unwilling to risk U.S. Treasury sanctions in order to do business with companies in Iran, whose economy is half the size of Maryland’s. Nevertheless, for the EU—led by Britain, France, and Germany, three of our closest friends—to create a mechanism to circumvent U.S. policy is truly startling.

European countries have also raised the possibility of reimposing economic sanctions on Iran, as the United States did. But they are doing so to get Iran back into compliance with the Obama-led nuclear agreement, not to force Iran to make the broader concessions that the Trump administration wants.

In short, the administration’s policies have created some potentially useful turmoil with respect to Iran. But they do not appear to be advancing the United States toward its objectives—and the U.S. is incurring significant reputational, military, and security costs in the process.