Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of the Islamist insurgent alliance that has captured swathes of [Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/syria) in a lightning offensive, is an extremist who has adopted a more moderate posture to try to achieve his goals. At the head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is rooted in Syria’s branch of Al-Qadia, Jolani says the goal of his offensive is to overthrow president Bashar al-Assad’s rule. “When we talk about objectives, the goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime. It is our right to use all available means to achieve that goal,” Jolani told CNN in an interview aired on Friday. Jolani operated from the shadows for years. Now, he is in the limelight, giving interviews to the international media and appearing on the ground in Syria’s second city Aleppo [after wresting it from government control for the first time in the country’s civil war.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/30/aleppo-russian-and-syrian-warplanes-target-insurgents) He has over the years stopped sporting the turban worn by jihadists, often favouring military fatigues instead. On Wednesday, he wore a khaki shirt and trousers to visit Aleppo’s citadel, standing at the door of his white vehicle as he waved and moved through the crowds. Since breaking ties with Al-Qaida in 2016, Jolani has sought to portray himself as a more moderate leader. But he is yet to quell suspicions among analysts and western governments that still class HTS as a terrorist organisation. “He is a pragmatic radical,” said Thomas Pierret, a specialist in political Islam. “In 2014, he was at the height of his radicalism,” Pierret said, referring to the period of the war when he sought to compete with the jihadist [Islamic State](https://www.theguardian.com/world/islamic-state) group. “Since then, he has moderated his rhetoric,” he added. Born in 1982, Jolani was born to a well-to-do family and raised in Mazzeh, an upmarket district of Damascus. During the offensive he launched on 27 November, he started signing his statements under his real name – Ahmed al-Sharaa. In 2021, he told US broadcaster PBS that his nom de guerre was a reference to his family roots in the Golan Heights, claiming that his grandfather had been forced to flee after Israel’s annexation of the area in 1967. According to the Middle East Eye news website, it was after the 11 [September 2001 attacks](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/september11) that Jolani was first drawn to jihadist thinking. [](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/06/who-is-abu-mohammed-al-jolani-leader-of-syrian-insurgents-hts#img-2) Syrian insurgents after they entered the city of Hama, Syria, on Friday. Photograph: Bilal Al Hammoud/EPA “It was as a result of this admiration for the 9/11 attackers that the first signs of jihadism began to surface in Jolani’s life, as he began attending secretive sermons and panel discussions in marginalised suburbs of Damascus,” the website said. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq, he left Syria to take part in the fight. He joined [Al-Qaida](https://www.theguardian.com/world/al-qaida) in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and was subsequently detained for five years, preventing him from rising through the ranks of the jihadist organisation. [ Can Syrian rebels maintain momentum and take Damascus? ](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/06/can-syrian-rebels-maintain-momentum-and-take-damascus) In March 2011, when the revolt against Assad’s rule erupted in Syria, he returned home and founded the al-Nusra Front, Syria’s branch of Al-Qaida. In 2013, he refused to swear allegiance to [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi), who would go on to become the emir of the Islamic State group, and instead pledged his loyalty to Al-Qaida’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. A realist in his partisans’ eyes, an opportunist to his adversaries, Jolani said in May 2015 that he, unlike Islamic State, had no intention of launching attacks against the west. He also proclaimed that should Assad be defeated, there would be no revenge attacks against the Alawite minority which the president’s clan stems from. He cut ties with Al-Qaida, claiming to do so in order to deprive the west of reasons to attack his organisation. According to Pierret, he has since sought to chart a path towards becoming a credible statesman. In January 2017, Jolani imposed a merger with HTS on rival Islamist groups in north-west Syria, thereby claiming control of swathes of Idlib province that had fallen out of government hands. In areas under its grip, HTS developed a civilian government and established a semblance of a state in Idlib province, while crushing its rebel rivals. Throughout this process, HTS faced accusations from residents and rights groups of brutal abuses against those who dared dissent, which the UN has classed as war crimes. Aware perhaps of the fear and hatred his group has sparked, Jolani has addressed residents of Aleppo, home to a sizeable Christian minority, in a bid to assure them that they would face no harm under his new regime. He also called on his fighters to preserve security in the areas they had “liberated” from Assad’s rule. “I think it’s primarily just good politics,” said Aron Lund, a fellow of the Century International thinktank. “The less local and international panic you have and the more Jolani seems like a responsible actor instead of a toxic jihadi extremist, the easier his job will become. Is it totally sincere? Surely not,” he said. “But it’s the smart thing to say and do right now.”

AFP Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani spoke to supporters at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus hours after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani has dropped that nom de guerre associated with his jihadist past, and been using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official communiques issued since Thursday, ahead of the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. This move is part of Jawlani's effort to bolster his legitimacy in a new context, as his Islamist militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), leading other rebel factions, announces the capture of the Syrian capital, Damascus, solidifying its control over much of the country. Jawlani's transformation is not recent, but has been carefully cultivated over the years, evident not only in his public statements and interviews with international outlets but also in his evolving appearance. Once clad in traditional jihadist militant attire, he has adopted a more Western-style wardrobe in the past years. Now, as he leads the offensive, he has donned military fatigues, symbolising his role as the commander of the operations room. But who is Jawlani - or Ahmed al-Sharaa - and why and how has he changed? The IS-Iraq link ---------------- A 2021 PBS interview with Jawlani revealed that he was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his father worked as an oil engineer until 1989. In that year, the Jawlani family returned to Syria, where he grew up and lived in the Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus. Jawlani's journey as a jihadist began in Iraq, linked to al-Qaeda through the Islamic State (IS) group's precursor - al-Qaeda in Iraq and, later, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). After the 2003 US-led invasion, he joined other foreign fighters in Iraq and, in 2005, was imprisoned at Camp Bucca, where he enhanced his jihadist affiliations and later on was introduced to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the quiet scholar who would later go on to lead IS. In 2011, Baghdadi sent Jawlani to Syria with funding to establish al-Nusra Front, a covert faction tied to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had become a prominent Syrian fighting force, hiding its IS and al-Qaeda ties. Reuters Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent Jawlani to Syria to establish Al-Nusra Front Tensions arose in 2013 when Baghdadi's group in Iraq unilaterally declared the merger of the two groups (ISI and Nusra), declaring the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and publicly revealing for the first time the links between them. Jawlani resisted, as he wanted to distance his group from ISI's violent tactics, leading to a split. To get out of that sticky situation, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian branch. From the start, he prioritised winning Syrian support, distancing himself from IS's brutality and emphasising a more pragmatic approach to jihad. * [Syria's Assad falls - follow live updates](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cj90138ejrdt) Joining al-Qaeda ---------------- In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, putting it at odds with IS. While Jawlani's move was partly an attempt to maintain local support and avoid alienating Syrians and rebel factions, the al-Qaeda affiliation ultimately did little to benefit this effort. It became a pressing challenge in 2015 when Nusra and other factions captured Idlib province, forcing them to co-operate in its administration. Reuters Jawlani rebranded al-Nusra Front as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016. The following year it became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham In 2016, Jawlani severed ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. While initially appearing superficial, the split revealed deeper divisions. Al-Qaeda accused Jawlani of betrayal, leading to defections and the formation of Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS later crushed in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, however, have remained cautiously present in the region. HTS also targeted IS operatives and foreign fighters in Idlib, dismantling their networks and forcing some to undergo "deradicalisation" programmes. These moves, justified as efforts to unify militant forces and reduce infighting, signalled Jawlani's strategy to position HTS as a dominant and politically viable force in Syria. Despite the public split from al-Qaeda and name changes, HTS continued to be designated by the UN, US, UK and other countries as a terrorist organisation, and the US maintained a $10m reward for information about Jawlani's whereabouts. Western powers considered the break-up to be a façade. Forming a 'government' in Idlib ------------------------------- Salvation Government Jawlani gave a press conference following the devastating 2023 earthquakes in Syria Under Jawlani, HTS became the dominant force in Idlib, north-west Syria's largest rebel stronghold and home to about four million people, many of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces. To address concerns about a militant group governing the area, HTS established a civilian front, the so-called "Syrian Salvation Government" (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm. The SG functioned like a state, with a prime minister, ministries and local departments overseeing sectors such as education, health and reconstruction, while maintaining a religious council guided by Sharia, or Islamic law. Salvation Government Jawlani was pictured looking at a painting of the Umayyad Mosque during a visit to a book, arts and culture fair in Idlib in 2022 To reshape his image, Jawlani actively engaged with the public, visiting displacement camps, attending events, and overseeing aid efforts, particularly during crises like the 2023 earthquakes. HTS highlighted achievements in governance and infrastructure to legitimise its rule and demonstrate its ability to provide stability and services. It has previously praised the Taliban, upon their return to power in 2021, lauding them as an inspiration and a model for effectively balancing jihadist efforts with political aspirations, including making tactical compromises to achieve their goals. Jawlani's efforts in Idlib reflected his broader strategy to demonstrate HTS's ability not only to wage jihad but also to govern effectively. By prioritising stability, public services and reconstruction, he aimed to showcase Idlib as a model of success under HTS rule, enhancing both his group's legitimacy and his own political aspirations. But under his leadership, HTS has crushed and marginalised other militant factions, both jihadists and rebel ones, in its effort to consolidate its power and dominate the scene. Anti-HTS protests ----------------- For over a year leading up to the HTS-led rebel offensive on 27 November, Jawlani faced protests in Idlib from hardline Islamists as well as Syrian activists. Critics compared his rule to Assad's, accusing HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters labelled HTS's security forces as "Shabbiha", a term used to describe Assad's loyalist henchmen. They further alleged that HTS deliberately avoided meaningful combat against government forces and marginalised jihadists and foreign fighters in Idlib to prevent them from engaging in such actions, all to appease international actors. Even during the latest offensive, activists have persistently urged HTS to release individuals imprisoned in Idlib allegedly for expressing dissent. In response to these criticisms, HTS initiated several reforms over the past year. It disbanded or rebranded a controversial security force accused of human rights violations and established a "Department of Grievances" to allow citizens to lodge complaints against the group. Its critics said these measures were just a show to contain dissent. AFP Earlier this year, protesters in Idlib demanded the release of detainees and an end to HTS's rule To justify its consolidation of power in Idlib and the suppression of plurality among militant groups, HTS argued that unifying under a single leadership was crucial for making progress and ultimately overthrowing the Syrian government. HTS and its civilian arm, the SG, walked a tightrope, striving to project a modern, moderate image to win over both the local population and the international community, while simultaneously maintaining their Islamist identity to satisfy hardliners within rebel-held areas and HTS's own ranks. For instance, in December 2023, HTS and the SG faced a backlash after a "festival" held at a glossy new shopping mall was criticised by hardliners as "immoral". And this August, a Paralympic Games-inspired ceremony drew sharp criticism from hardliners, prompting the SG to review the organisation of such events. These incidents illustrate the challenges HTS faces in reconciling the expectations of its Islamist base with the broader demands of the Syrian population, who are seeking freedom and coexistence after years of authoritarian rule under Assad. Leading a new path? ------------------- As the latest offensive unfolded, global media focused on Jawlani's jihadist past, prompting some rebel supporters to call for him to step back, viewing him as a liability. Although he previously expressed willingness to dissolve his group and step aside, his recent actions and public appearances tell a different story. HTS's success in uniting rebels and nearly capturing the whole country in under two weeks has strengthened Jawlani's position, quieting hardline critics and accusations of opportunism. AFP HTS and its allies launched the offensive that overthrew Assad at the end of November Jawlani and the SG have since reassured domestic and international audiences. To Syrians, including minorities, they promised safety; to neighbours and powers like Russia, they pledged peaceful relations. Jawlani even assured Russia its Syrian bases would remain unharmed if attacks ceased. This shift reflects HTS's "moderate jihad" strategy since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over rigid ideology. Jawlani's approach could signal the decline of global jihad movements like IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is increasingly seen as ineffective and unsustainable. His trajectory might inspire other groups to adapt, marking either a new era of localised, politically flexible "jihadism" or just a temporary divergence from the traditional path in order to make political and territorial gains.

12月8日星期日，伊斯兰激进组织“沙姆解放组织”（HTS）领导的叙利亚反政府武装进入大马士革几小时后，其领导人朱拉尼也进入了首都，最终给阿萨德的统治画上句点 ... 在一片草地上快速跪拜过后，身着衬衫和卡其色长裤的朱拉尼来到了雄伟的倭马亚清真寺，这座拥有1300年历史的建筑是伊斯兰教的第四大圣寺，也是叙利亚遗产中的一颗明珠。他没有选择在演播室或者总统府，而是在这处具有非凡宗教意义的场所来进行推翻阿萨德政府后第一次公众讲话

The deadly [attack in New Orleans](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/01/02/us/new-orleans-attack-news) on New Year’s Eve that left 15 people dead feels like a disturbing reminder of a past era, one when the transnational terrorist organization known as the [Islamic State](https://www.vox.com/2015/12/16/10240188/what-is-isis-history-background-qaeda), or ISIS, [dominated the nation’s attention and resources](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/12/13/23998928/hamas-taliban-isis-attacks-terrorism-extremist-groups-israel-palestine). The attacker, Shamsud-Din Bahar Jabbar, a 42-year-old Army veteran from Texas, rammed a truck into Bourbon Street before he was killed in a shootout with police. Jabbar was flying an ISIS flag from his vehicle and [posted videos on Facebook](https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/01/us/shamsud-din-jabbar-suspect-new-orleans-attack/index.html) shortly before the attack, pledging support to the group. In a [briefing on Thursday](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-aOb4qpmwA&ab_channel=AssociatedPress), FBI Deputy Assistant Director Christopher Raia described Jabbar as “100 percent inspired by ISIS.” Raia said that Jabbar, who had also planted two explosive devices on Bourbon Street that never went off, claimed he had joined ISIS before last summer. In his videos, Jabbar said he had originally planned to attack his relatives and friends — he had recently gone through a divorce — but worried that media coverage would not focus on what he called the “war between the believers and disbelievers.” [Authorities are also investigating](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7qd97eyp0o) whether there is any link between the attack and a truck bombing that took place outside the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas on the same day, though for now there does not appear to be. Using trucks and vans to ram into crowds has been a staple of deadly ISIS-linked attacks for years, from [Nice, France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-nice-truck-attack) to [Barcelona](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/18/isil-claims-responsibility-for-van-attack-in-barcelona), to [Berlin](https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/19/europe/berlin-christmas-market-truck/index.html), to [Stockholm](https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/09/europe/stockholm-attack-arrests/index.html). New Orleans is likely the biggest ISIS-inspired attack on US soil since 2016, when gunman [Omar Mateen killed 49 people](https://www.vox.com/2016/6/12/11911962/pulse-gay-nightclub-shooting-orlando-updates-news) at Pulse, an LGBTQ+ nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The last significant ISIS-inspired attack in the US was in 2017, when [Sayfullo Saipov drove a truck](https://www.vox.com/world/2017/11/1/16589892/new-york-city-uzbekistan-terror-attack-sayfullo-saipov) onto Manhattan’s West Side Highway, killing eight people. ISIS-linked violence is still common around the world — there was a major [suicide attack on a military base in Somalia](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-security-forces-repulse-suicide-attack-by-islamic-state-2024-12-31/?oref=d_brief_nl&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20D%20Brief:%20January%2002%2C%202025&utm_term=newsletter_d1_dbrief) just this week. The group’s Afghanistan-based affiliate, ISIS-K, has been particularly ambitious and global in its activities. It carried out an [attack on Moscow’s Crocus theater](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/23/24109865/moscow-crocus-city-hall-theater-terrorist-attack-russia-isis-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war) that killed more than 130 people last March, as well as the suicide bombings that killed nearly 100 people in Tehran in January 2024. In August, authorities foiled a “quite advanced” ISIS-K plot to attack a [Taylor Swift concert in Austria](https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/politics/taylor-swift-concert-plot-cia-us-intelligence/index.html). The fact that there hadn’t been any recent ISIS-inspired attacks in the US in recent years may not be from lack of trying. Aaron Y. Zelin, who researches and tracks jihadist groups at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, [notes that there were five arrests](https://www.jihadologyplus.com/p/islamic-state-related-arrests-in-af4) for ISIS-related plots in the US in 2024, including attempts to “target churches in Idaho, LGBTQ ‘establishments’ in Philadelphia, Jewish centers/synagogues in New York City, election day voting locations in Oklahoma City, and a Pride parade in Phoenix.” That’s up from zero arrests of this type in 2023. The fact that one of the group’s self-acknowledged acolytes has now succeeded to deadly and tragic effect raises some tough questions about whether ISIS is primed for a resurgence, and what it actually means to be “ISIS-affiliated” today. ISIS [traces its origins](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/01/the-rise-of-isis.html) back to 2011, when fighters from al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate, then led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, traveled to Syria to create a new affiliate there to fight in that country’s civil war. In 2013, al-Baghdadi tried to merge the Iraqi and Syrian affiliates, a move that was rejected by al-Qaeda leaders and led to a major schism in the global jihadi movement. In 2014, Baghdadi’s group began seizing towns in western Iraq, eventually taking Mosul, Iraqi’s largest city. At its height in 2014 and 2015, the group controlled [an area the size of Great Britain](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/12/heres-how-the-islamic-state-compares-to-real-states/), which Baghdadi declared as a new “caliphate” under his rule. ISIS’s emphasis on controlling territory and imposing its brutal theocratic rule, rather than remaining underground, distinguished it from other militant groups, as did the bloody theatricality of its methods: The group burst into many Americans’ consciousness with the [videotaped beheadings of two American journalists](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/09/james-foley-steven-sotloff-what-happens-if-isis-keeps-beheading-americans.html). A US-led military intervention to fight ISIS began in 2014. In 2019, the group’s last territorial outpost in Syria fell to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Al-Baghdadi himself was [killed in a US raid](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1999751/us-forces-kill-isis-founder-leader-baghdadi-in-syria/) a few months later. In 2020, President Donald Trump proclaimed in his State of the Union address that “[the ISIS territorial caliphate has been 100 percent destroyed](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address-3/).” This was basically true, but ISIS in a more diffuse form has outlived the territorial caliphate. In Iraq and Syria, it continues to operate underground and carry out attacks, and is regularly targeted in airstrikes and raids by US forces and their local partners. But in many ways, what was once known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is a [more decentralized and global organization today,](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10328) in which local franchises from Afghanistan, to Somalia, to West Africa, to Mozambique are now often far more active and dangerous than the core group. They also operate more like traditional terrorist organizations than the quasi-nation state that ISIS was at its peak. ISIS is also still very much a presence online, though somewhat less so than it was at the caliphate era, researchers say. Like other militant groups, it is particularly active on the [encrypted messaging app Telegram](https://www.counterextremism.com/terrorists-on-telegram), as well as the decentralized messaging platform [Rocket.Chat](https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/islamic_state_group_experiments_with_the_decentralised_web_-_p.king_.pdf). (Other social media platforms are more closely monitored, though the [wide spread of footage from the Crocus attack on X](https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-islamic-states-amaq-goes-viral-premium-enabled-terror-content-on-x/) suggests the site formerly known as Twitter has become more of a free-for-all in its current incarnation.) ISIS distinguished itself from al-Qaeda and other groups through its heavy use of English-language propaganda and by encouraging sympathizers to carry out attacks in ISIS’s name. This would appear to be what just happened in New Orleans. “They put out stuff about doing attacks in English almost every day,” the Washington Institute’s Zelin said. According to the FBI, Jabbar claimed in the videos he posted on the night of the attack that he had joined ISIS before last summer, but the FBI’s Raia also emphasized that based on analysis of Jabbar’s communications and social media accounts, “there is just nothing to indicate … that he was aided in this attack by anyone.” In other words, he acted alone, but also considered himself part of a group. This is not as much of a contradiction as it might seem. Some of the largest and deadliest ISIS attacks in the West, such as the [2015 massacre](https://www.vox.com/world/2015/11/13/9733116/paris-attacks-bataclan) of 130 people at several locations in Paris, were coordinated by ISIS itself or carried out by people who had fought and trained with the group in the Middle East. But this is increasingly rare. As the French counterterrorism analyst Wassim Nasr [told Vox in July](https://www.vox.com/olympics/362512/olympics-paris-isis-russia-terrorism-security), “All these things used to be done from ISIS hubs, but ISIS doesn’t have territory anymore. It’s totally dematerialized.” More common are for people who want to carry out attacks to interact only with ISIS “cyber-coaches” who advise them on planning and logistics. Sometimes, the relationship is even less direct. The Orlando and Manhattan attackers don’t appear to have had any interaction with ISIS abroad. They were “self-radicalized” — inspired by the group’s message and methods to carry out an attack of their own. That also seems to be the case with Jabbar, based on statements from law enforcement, though it’s still early days. One development that could change our understanding of the attacks is if ISIS were to post a pre-recorded message from Jabbar on its own channels. “That would suggest that this wasn’t just somebody that was only inspired by ISIS, but was likely in contact with ISIS operatives,” Zelin said. (In the case of the Moscow attacks, the ISIS-affiliated Amaq News Agency [posted bodycam footage](https://kyivindependent.com/isis-releases-bodycam-footage-of-moscow-shooting/) from the attack itself.) So far, none of ISIS’s official channels have claimed credit for the attack, though there’s a good chance they will. ISIS has never been shy about claiming credit, even for attacks it clearly had nothing to do with. Colin Clarke, a counterterrorism researcher at the Soufan Center, noted that ISIS-affiliated [Telegram and Rocket.Chat channels](https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-2/) had been calling for attacks over Christmas and New Year’s. Clarke told Vox that the fact that Jabbar doesn’t appear to be part of an organized underground cell shouldn’t necessarily be comforting. “To me, the fact that it was a lone actor is more nefarious,” he said. “That’s the ISIS model. They want to be able to reach out and inspire somebody in the US to be able to do this. Their ultimate goal is to make Americans fearful.” There was already renewed global concern about an ISIS resurgence before the New Orleans attack, mainly due to events in the Middle East. As White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan put it, there’s concern that ISIS will “[get new oxygen](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/12/08/remarks-by-apnsa-jake-sullivan-at-the-2024-reagan-national-defense-forum/)” from the instability in Syria following the overthrow of longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad. (The main group that [has taken power in Syria](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/390261/syria-bashar-assad-damascus-civil-war-refugee), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, is itself the successor of the al-Qaeda affiliate that split from ISIS back in 2013, though it has also renounced al-Qaeda and is attempting to present a more moderate face to the world.) The US has been [stepping up its strikes](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3989696/us-central-command-conducts-dozens-of-airstrikes-to-eliminate-isis-camps-in-cen/) against ISIS targets in Syria since Assad’s fall, in an attempt to prevent it from taking advantage. There’s also [concern about the security of the camps](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/17/us-syria-isis-jails-00194955) in northeast Syria where thousands of ISIS fighters and their families have been detained for years. These camps are under the control the US-backed, predominantly Kurdish SDF, which is [currently under threat](https://apnews.com/article/syria-kurds-turkey-sdf-manbij-kobani-84928d1755cc09c239fe00074291ff0f) from the Turkish military and its local proxies. “ISIS will be a policy question for the \[incoming\] Trump administration,” said Javed Ali, a longtime FBI terrorism analyst who served on the National Security Council during Trump’s first term. “Despite the fact that ISIS is not the organization it was a decade ago, we do need to take a new look at our counterterrorism approach.” Though Trump frequently touts the defeat of ISIS’s caliphate among his first-term accomplishments, he has also frequently expressed a desire to scale back US commitments in the Middle East, including removing the troops in Syria currently involved in fighting remnants of ISIS. (For what it’s worth, the [president-elect’s first reaction](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/01/us/politics/trump-new-orleans.html?oref=d_brief_nl&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20D%20Brief:%20January%2002%2C%202025&utm_term=newsletter_d1_dbrief) to the attack was to falsely claim that the US-born Jabbar was an immigrant.) Overall, counterterrorism is far [less of a point of emphasis for US national security](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/352855/war-on-terror-biden-isis-al-qaeda) than it was a decade ago, as attention and resources have shifted to “great power competition” with China and Russia. That’s an understanding and mostly welcome developments, but a few more events like what we just saw in New Orleans could change that trend very quickly. You’ve read 1 article in the last month Here at Vox, we're unwavering in our commitment to covering the issues that matter most to you — threats to democracy, immigration, reproductive rights, the environment, and the rising polarization across this country. Our mission is to provide clear, accessible journalism that empowers you to stay informed and engaged in shaping our world. By becoming a Vox Member, you directly strengthen our ability to deliver in-depth, independent reporting that drives meaningful change. We rely on readers like you — join us.  Swati Sharma Vox Editor-in-Chief See More: * [Politics](https://www.vox.com/politics) * [Terrorism](https://www.vox.com/terrorism) * [World Politics](https://www.vox.com/world-politics)

DAMASCUS, Syria -- Samir al-Baghdad grabbed his pickax and walked up a wobbly set of stairs made of cinderblocks and rubble. He is rebuilding his destroyed family house in the Qaboun neighborhood near Damascus, [Syria](https://apnews.com/hub/syria) 's capital. The traditional building, which once housed his family, parents and some relatives, had a courtyard decorated with plants and tiled floors where guests were received. But the house, like scores of others nearby, has been reduced to heaps of rubble during years of civil war. Al-Baghdadi can’t afford to hire workers or rent a bulldozer to clear the debris and fix the house. He makes just about enough money as a mechanic to feed his family. But he's desperate to rebuild it because he is struggling to pay skyrocketing rent for an apartment. “Economic opportunities are basically nonexistent,” al-Baghdadi said, sitting on a pile of rubble and debris where the house’s entrance used to be. “So we’re going to slowly rebuild with our own hands.” Although Syrian President Bashar Assad was toppled last month in a [lightning insurgency](https://apnews.com/article/syria-baath-party-hafez-bashar-assad-f541e2d3eb3c8471ddecffcb7d4e3d91), the country's dire economic conditions that protesters decried have not changed. The economy has been battered by corruption and 13 years of civil war. Coupled with international sanctions and mismanagement, inflation skyrocketed, pulling some 90% of the country into poverty. Over half the population -- some 12 million people -- [don’t know where their next meal will come from](https://apnews.com/article/syria-poverty-un-wfp-mccain-5ccee0d9b5d3b316d46d1c4792450afa), according to the U.N. World Food Program. With [no sign of a full-scale withdrawal of international sanctions](https://apnews.com/article/treasury-bashar-assad-sanctions-syria-biden-4df4fb793579c7aa820bcf5392286bd5) and continuing caution among potential overseas investors, the honeymoon period for the country's new rulers could be short-lived. Qaboun, just a stone’s throw away from the city center, and other eastern Damascus neighborhoods became rebel strongholds in 2012, when the country’s mass protests against Assad spiraled into all-out war. It suffered government airstrikes and artillery fire, and at one point [Islamic State group extremists](https://apnews.com/article/syria-islamic-state-united-states-airstrikes-b4e72b3fd8fff4e9364597a1ca817803). In 2017, government forces reclaimed the neighborhood, but when al-Baghdadi tried to return in 2020, security forces kicked him out and forced him to sign a pledge to never return, saying it was a security zone that was off limits. After Assad's fall, al-Baghdadi was finally able to return. Like many, he was euphoric and hoped it would pave the way for better times despite the many challenges that lay ahead, including rampant power cuts and fuel shortages. For years, Syrian families have relied on humanitarian aid and remittances from family members living abroad to survive. On top of the gargantuan costs of rebuilding the country’s destroyed electricity, water and road infrastructure, money is needed to restore its battered agriculture and industrial sectors to make its hobbled economy productive again. The United Nations in 2017 estimated that it would cost at least $250 billion to rebuild Syria. Some experts now say that number could reach at least $400 billion. Wealthy Gulf countries have pledged to build [economic partnerships](https://apnews.com/article/syria-diplomacy-qatar-hts-b331443993d0b5a7443b1462183c4be2) with Syria’s new interim rulers, while Washington has eased some restrictions without fully lifting its sanctions. The U.S. Treasury Department issued a six-month license authorizing some transactions with Syria’s interim government. While it includes some energy sales, Syrians say it isn't enough. Sinan Hatahet, an economic researcher at the Washington-based Atlantic Council think tank, said the U.S. actions were the “bare minimum” needed to show good faith to Damascus and aren't enough to help Syria jumpstart its economy. “It doesn’t help the private sector to engage,” Hatahet said. “The restrictions on trade, the restrictions on reconstruction, on rebuilding the infrastructure are still there.” While countries are hesitant to make more impactful decisions as they hope for a peaceful political transition, many Syrians say the economy can’t wait. “Without jobs, without huge flows of money and investments … these families have no way of making ends meet,” Hatahet said. The executive director of the World Food Program echoed similar sentiments, warning Syria’s neighbors that its food and economic crisis is also a crisis of security. “Hunger does not breed good will,” Cindy McCain said in an interview during her first visit to Damascus. In the Syrian capital’s bustling old marketplace, crowds of people pack the narrow passageways as the country's new de facto flag is draped over the crowded stalls. Merchants say the atmosphere is pleasant and celebratory, but nobody is buying anything. People stop to smell the aromatic and colorful spices or pose for photos next to masked fighters from the ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group guarding the market’s entrances. “We’re very happy with our liberation, thank God, but there are few jobs,” said Walid Naoura, who works with his father at a clothing shop. “Yes, we’ve been relieved of thuggery and oppression, but all these people here have come to celebrate but not to buy anything because things are expensive.” Nearby, Abou Samir, a carpenter, saws a piece of wood as he assembles a chest of drawers. There is no electricity to power his machinery, so he’s doing it by hand. “I’m working at a loss … and you can’t make larger workshops work because there is no electricity,” he said. His sons live abroad and send money to help him get by, but he refuses to stop his carpentry work which has been his livelihood for 50 years. In Qaboun, al-Baghdadi sips tea on a makeshift porch overlooking his neighborhood, which has turned into empty plots and a gathering point for local buses and minivans. It was a successful day because he managed to connect an electric cable to power a single light bulb — but part of his roof collapsed. He still hasn’t been able to secure running water but hopes that he and his family can move into the house with its many memories before summer, even if it is far from completion because of his financial situation. “I prefer that to living in a palace elsewhere,” al-Baghdadi said.

In the small courtyard of Sara’s grandmother’s house, children are running and playing as if time had never passed. “The house kept our memories,” Sara says, sitting on the sofa of the courtyard. “It seems like we never left. On the contrary, when we came back, we felt we belonged to this house.” Located in the old Iraqi city of Mosul, right behind the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, their home is part of the local cultural heritage. It was [heavily damaged](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/21/mosuls-grand-al-nouri-mosque-blown-up-by-isis-fighters) during the occupation by Islamic State (IS) and the battle to reclaim the city by Iraqi armed forces, backed by US coalition airstrikes. Sara and her family were forcibly displaced during the fighting in 2017 and for many years feared they would never see their home intact again. “It was amazing when we could step in,” Sara says. “The neighbourhood has changed a lot, but it’s still very beautiful and we’re optimistic that more and more neighbours will resettle in their home town.” Most of these old houses have been restored, thanks to a Unesco-led project called Revive the Spirit of Mosul, which includes the renovation of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and other sites. “Most of our family members are employed here in the reconstruction of the city,” Sara says. “Life is still precarious, but we hope that 10 years after Daesh \[IS\] occupied our beloved city, it will only improve.” [](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/02/mosul-iraq-islamic-state-mosque-reconstruction-ramadan#img-2) Architect Layla Saleh, head of the reconstruction team of Al-Tahera Church. Photograph: Alessio Mamo/The Observer The mosque’s leaning minaret, named Al-Habda or the hunchback, has been restored under Unesco’s supervision and reopened last month. Built in 1172, it is 45m tall and decorated with ornamental brickwork along its cylindrical shaft and square base. The self-proclaimed caliph of the IS, [Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate), inaugurated the “caliphate” from the pulpit inside the mosque in 2014. The renovation of the Great Mosque will be completed during Ramadan, which began on Friday, and 11 years after IS made [Mosul](https://www.theguardian.com/world/mosul) its capital. The prayer hall will already be open for Ramadan prayers – for the first time since IS’s defeat. “The citizens of Mosul are very happy. The last finishing touches need to be completed, but we can open the mosque for Ramadan prayers,” says engineer Omar Taqa, responsible of the restoration project under Unesco. “We are proud to have worked on this project, which is the largest Unesco project in the world, with $50m implemented. For the official opening and inauguration of the Great Mosque, arrangements are being made to hold a ceremony with the Iraqi prime minister.” Last June, during their work, five large IS bombs were found hidden in the site, which postponedefforts for some days. [](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/02/mosul-iraq-islamic-state-mosque-reconstruction-ramadan#img-3) The Baytuna (‘Our House’) association in the Old City of Mosul. Photograph: Alessio Mamo/The Observer Huda, who lives next to the mosque, is originally from Baghdad and moved to Mosul with her husband after being displaced in a Christian neighbourhood in Erbil. “I’m a Christian, the only one living in the old houses for now,” she says. “Before the Daesh occupation, many more Christians were inhabiting the old city. I have two children and my husband is working on the al-Nuri mosque renovation. I feel at home here.” Father Raed, a local priest, told the _Observer_ that, even though the large majority of Christians haven’t resettled in Mosul, they come to the city daily from Erbil or nearby Christian-majority cities such as Qaraqosh for employment or to attend the church. Yamama Saleh, a civil engineer employed by the UN agency, has also been involved in the reconstruction of the mosque. “It’s the landmark of Mosul. I used to see the minaret from my rooftop, so when it got destroyed, it was really sad. But after being involved in the rebuilding of the shaft, it has another meaning for me. Now we’re done, I will go back to the rooftop to take a picture from there.” Her colleague, Mustafa al-Zeewany, supervisor of the minaret works, is standing on top of the minaret. “The minaret is iconic,” he says. “All our workers here are feeling proud. We felt devastated when the minaret was blown up by IS in June 2017, and now we have the abilities and capabilities to redo it, using international and new techniques.” [](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/02/mosul-iraq-islamic-state-mosque-reconstruction-ramadan#img-4) The restoration of the Mosque of Prophet Younis. Photograph: Alessio Mamo/The Observer Al-Zeewany explains that new techniques were implemented because they allowed work to be done in a similar way to the time of the construction of the mosque and minaret in the 12th century. “It’s a great experience for all of us to know how our ancestors worked, especially in this kind of construction.” The colourful neighbourhood in front of the old houses and the Great Mosque is called al-Manqusha. It’s where young people gather because of the cultural associations and cafes in the area. Saker Ma’an, founder of Baytuna (“Our house”) association, based in an old, imposing two-storey house, says: “In 2017, after the battle against Daesh, being here felt like living in the desert. We cleaned the neighbourhood of the rubble with our bare hands, we found corpses and unexploded bombs, then we finally managed to restore this traditional house and make it a cafe and office for our activities.” Ma’an recalls that some locals told him “you will not last”. In the beginning, the cafe hosted no more than two people a week. “We now have dozens coming every day,” he says. “Especially the new generation: they came back to a destroyed city, not having any sense of belonging to the old city. But our association is working together with youth, to make them aware of their cultural heritage. Mosul really needed this place.” [](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/02/mosul-iraq-islamic-state-mosque-reconstruction-ramadan#img-5) Restoration work at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri. Photograph: Alessio Mamo/The Observer Ma’an remarks that the new generation doesn’t know the archaeological sites of the Nineveh province of Mosul, such as the old Assyrian city of Nimrod, 30km south of Mosul, badly damaged by the terrorist group, like many others. Layla Salih, an archaeologist responsible for the Bashiqa district and head of the reconstruction team of Al-Tahera church (Upper Monastery) project, is an expert on the archaeological sites of Nineveh, the Mosul province. “Many projects initiated after the liberation of the city were distributed between reconstruction, rescue or excavation work, and there are projects of documentation, archaeological and heritage survey, as well as the restoration of archaeological objects,” she says. Salih has become very well-known in the city after her discovery back in 2017 of a new archaeological site, the Assyrian Essarhadon’s Palace, in a tunnel under the al-Nabi Yunes shrine, dug by IS militants who were searching for antiquities to plunder and sell. “I expect that the renovation of Mosul will continue for years … and it is remarkable that the international community is so interested in the city for its ethnic, religious and cultural diversity.” When IS was first driven out of Nineveh province in November 2016, Salih and a colleague, Faisal Jaber, reported on the destruction of Christian sites in the province. “We hope for more cultural projects that contribute to building peace, promoting stability and coexistence.”

Besieged by thousands of lawsuits alleging that its paraquat [weedkiller](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/herbicides) causes [Parkinson’s disease](https://www.theguardian.com/society/parkinsons-disease), its manufacturer, Syngenta, has entered into an agreement aimed at settling large swaths of those claims. A court filing on Monday confirmed that a letter of agreement between the parties had been signed. In a court hearing on Tuesday, one of the lead plaintiff lawyers, Khaldoun Baghdadi, said the terms of the settlement should be completed within 30 days. The move to settle comes amid mounting calls from state and federal lawmakers to ban paraquat, and as growing numbers of Parkinson’s patients blame the company for not warning them of paraquat risks. Numerous scientific studies have linked Parkinson’s to exposure to paraquat, a weedkiller commonly used in agriculture, though Syngenta has said the weight of scientific evidence shows its pesticide does not cause the disease. The agreement would not resolve all of the cases filed in the United States against Syngenta, but could resolve the majority of them. As of mid-April, there were more than 5,800 active lawsuits pending in what is known as multidistrict litigation (MDL) being overseen by a federal court in Illinois. There were more than 450 other cases filed in California, and many more scattered in state courts around the country. The agreement notice applies to people whose lawsuits are part of the MDL, and could provide settlements for plaintiffs in the cases outside the MDL as well, said Baghdadi. “Syngenta has settled certain claims in the federal Multi-District Litigation (MDL) and California court in the United States related to paraquat,” the company said. “Syngenta believes there is no merit to the claims, but litigation can be distracting and costly. Entering into the agreement in no way implies that paraquat causes Parkinson’s disease or that Syngenta has done anything wrong. We stand by the safety of paraquat. Despite decades of investigation and more than 1,200 epidemiological and laboratory studies of paraquat, no scientist or doctor has ever concluded in a peer-reviewed scientific analysis that paraquat causes Parkinson’s disease.” Syngenta’s effort to settle the litigation before any high-profile trials comes after Monsanto’s owner, Bayer, was rocked by similar litigation alleging its Roundup weedkiller causes cancer. After the company lost the first Roundup trial, its stock price plummeted, and Bayer has spent years and billions of dollars fighting to end the ongoing litigation. Lawyers for paraquat plaintiffs in cases outside the MDL expressed frustration with the situation, saying they were not included in the settlement discussions, and were not being given details about the settlement. They fear their cases may be delayed or otherwise negatively affected by a settlement that benefits some plaintiffs but may not actually provide value to the majority of them. “These plaintiffs are dying every day,” Majed Nachawati, a lawyer whose clients are outside the MDL, told a judge in a California court hearing on Tuesday on the matter. He said the news of the settlement was a “shock” because he was not apprised of the settlement negotiations by the other plaintiffs’ lawyers, as he should have been. Paraquat has become one of the most widely used weedkilling chemicals in the world. In the United States, the chemical is used in orchards, wheat fields, pastures where livestock graze, cotton fields and elsewhere. Internal Syngenta documents revealed by the Guardian and the New Lede show the company was [aware many years ago](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/20/syngenta-weedkiller-pesticide-parkinsons-disease-paraquat-documents) of scientific evidence that paraquat could affect the brain in ways that cause Parkinson’s, and that it [secretly sought to influence scientific research](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/02/paraquat-parkinsons-disease-research-syngenta-weedkiller) to counter the evidence of harm. _This story is co-published with the [New Lede](https://www.thenewlede.org/), a journalism project of the Environmental Working Group_

Donald Trump has a long and colorful history with the Islamic State. He incorrectly [blamed the founding of IS](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/11/donald-trump-calls-barack-obama-the-founder-of-isis) on his predecessor, said its infamous leader [“died like a dog”](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-killed-us-donald-trump) while announcing his assassination, and rallied an international coalition that successfully ended its so-called caliphate. So far, in his second presidency, his administration has much less to do with IS. But the terror group has still benefited from him. Experts tell the Guardian that IS is capitalizing on Trump’s dismantling of the international order, his affinity for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel, and most of all – his most [controversial cabinet appointment](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/15/pete-hegseth-defense-department-policy) – in its recruitment propaganda. In the US, IS supporters consuming that online messaging have become bona fide security threats in recent months, with a string of incidents dating back to before the presidential election. On New Year’s Day in New Orleans, [Shamsud-Din Jabbar](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/01/shamsud-din-jabbar-new-orleans-attack), 42, a 13-year veteran of the US army, used a truck to kill fourteen partygoers in the name of IS. Earlier in May, [Ammar Abdulmajid-Mohamed Said](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/michigan-man-arrested-and-charged-attempting-attack-military-base-behalf-isis), 19, an ex-national guardsman, was arrested and charged with plotting a mass shooting at a military base near Detroit, on behalf of the group. “The January 1 New Orleans attack and subsequent IS-linked arrests in the country demonstrate the continued influence the organization can project into the US,” said Lucas Webber, a senior threat intelligence analyst at [Tech Against Terrorism](https://techagainstterrorism.org/home), who has tracked the terrorist group for several years. “These incidents also highlight how IS leverages the online space through social media and messaging applications to spread its ideology and inspire supporters to plot attacks.” Part of that, as Webber explained, was persistently defining the US as a “crusader” state – the name jihadists have long used for all western countries. But secretary of defense Pete Hegseth’s tattoos, referential to those pan-European medieval invaders, have fueled IS propaganda dispersed on Rocket.Chat – a recruitment platform the terror group uses to communicate with its followers and recruits. An April IS-article, titled Clear Evidence in Ink, zeroed in on [Hegseth’s ink](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/27/pete-hegseth-tattoo-arabic-language), which features crosses associated with crusaders and another on his arm that reads “infidel” or “non-believer” in Arabic. The term also became better known among war on terror soldiers, who, like Hegseth, served in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a pejorative for themselves. “This takes us back to the media stir just days ago when the American ‘crusader’ secretary of defense published photos of himself with the word ‘kafir’ written on his arm in Arabic, alongside other explicit phrases glorifying the crusades!” said the IS propaganda, amid a backdrop of Hegseth’s tattooed chest and arms. “Events like these, orchestrated by Allah’s wisdom, serve as warnings and clear evidence of the true nature of the war waged by Jews and Christians against us – it is a deeply rooted religious war.” On Rocket.Chat, pro-IS users fervently responded. “What more do you want as proof that they want to wipe us all together?” wrote one user underneath an image of Hegseth’s tattoos. Other fodder tapped for its digital propaganda, is Trump’s associations with Netanyahu and the IDF’s continued flattening of Gaza, which several experts and [governments](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/16/israel-closes-dublin-embassy-ireland-genocide-petition-humanitarian-law-michael-martin) have called a [modern-day genocide](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/09/israel-committing-genocide-in-gaza-says-eus-former-top-diplomat). IS images and articles call for “revenge for the Muslims in Gaza” and the war, which has become one of its most valuable recruitment topics. IS also sees the stream of international tariffs unleashed by the [Trump administration](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/trump-administration) as a sign the west and its power structures are unravelling. As another IS article described how “the reckless Trump has repeatedly claimed victory over jihad, yet now he is preoccupied with fighting German cars and Chinese goods” and stoking “commercial wars” that would lead to the demise of “kafir nations”. Combinations of these topics are mainstay recruitment hooks that IS and its predecessor organization, al-Qaida, have used for years attracting men into its ranks. IS is in a rebuilding stage as Syria – once a base for its most successful era – has vowed to banish the group and other jihadist elements from operating within its borders, as the nascent government seeks [rapprochement with the US](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/14/trump-meets-syria-president-after-lifting-us-sanctions). But other IS chapters have shown they are attracting Americans, foreigners, and locals to their cause, by peddling anti-US messaging. “Trump and the US have been monitored by \[IS-Khorasan\] Pashto, Urdu and Farsi channels specifically referring to developments in Syria and Afghanistan,” said Riccardo Valle, the director of research at the Islamabad-based publication [the Khorasan Diary](https://www.thekhorasandiary.com/) and an expert on the group’s Afghan wing. “\[IS-K\] continue to foster the idea that there is no difference between Afghanistan and Syria trajectories and that both are puppets in the hands of the US, Russia, and China.” The IS-K branch has shown its reach inside the US, too. An Afghan national and a co-conspirator [were arrested in October](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/afghan-national-arrested-plotting-election-day-terrorist-attack-name-isis), after the FBI disrupted an IS-K sponsored plot to attack a mass gathering on election day. The justice department also described in 2024 [court documents](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.569433/gov.uscourts.mdd.569433.1.1.pdf) that IS-Somalia, an upstart branch which has become the [intense focus of Pentagon airstrikes](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/01/donald-trump-us-airstrikes-islamic-state-somalia), had attracted an American foreign fighter who was in contact with their recruiters. “IS-Somalia is becoming more internationally ambitious in its recruitment, associated online propaganda, and incitement efforts,” Webber said. “Pro-IS Somalia outlets are creating media content focused on US policy in the region and support for governments in the area.”