On a Monday in March, in the heart of China’s capital, more than 2,000 delegates of a rubber-stamp advisory body to the authoritarian government of President Xi Jinping gathered for their annual meeting. One mission of the men and women in attendance was to spread the global influence of China’s Communist Party. Of the throngs of party officials, generals and business executives who watched as [Mr. Xi took the stage](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ7qCdLym2U), just 20 people had been invited to represent the country’s vast diaspora, including a single person from the United States: a 69-year-old man from Brooklyn named John Chan. Mr. Chan’s participation reflected a remarkable proximity to the highest levels of power in China, experts said, and marked him as a person on whom the country’s leaders might call for favors. But it was remarkable, too, because of his position at home: He has operated as a power broker in America’s largest city, with immense sway over an important subset of New York politics. For years, Mr. Chan has exerted influence over the city’s ethnic Chinese communities — reaching into back rooms and political clubhouses from Sunset Park in Brooklyn to Manhattan’s Chinatown to Flushing in Queens — to help sway elections, all without drawing much attention. But lately, federal investigations into foreign influence efforts have swirled around city and state government in New York. Mayor Eric Adams has been [charged with conspiring](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/09/26/nyregion/eric-adams-indictment-charges-annotated.html) to accept illegal foreign campaign contributions from Turkey. He has pleaded not guilty. One of his top aides, an Asian affairs director with [ties to China](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/13/nyregion/adams-greco-china-influence-investigation.html), had her homes searched in an investigation by Brooklyn federal prosecutors who have separately brought cases against people they suspect of being Chinese agents. The same prosecutors recently accused an aide to Gov. Kathy Hochul of serving the Chinese government by [blocking](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/03/nyregion/linda-sun-arrested-hochul.html) Taiwanese officials from the governor’s office. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and [log into](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F09%2Fnyregion%2Fchan-china-nyc-influence.html&asset=opttrunc) your Times account, or [subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F09%2Fnyregion%2Fchan-china-nyc-influence.html) for all of The Times. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. Already a subscriber? [Log in](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F09%2Fnyregion%2Fchan-china-nyc-influence.html&asset=opttrunc). Want all of The Times? [Subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F09%2Fnyregion%2Fchan-china-nyc-influence.html).

A suspected Chinese spy with business ties to Prince Andrew has been barred from the U.K. because of concerns he posed a threat to national security LONDON -- A suspected Chinese spy with business ties to Prince Andrew has been barred from the U.K. because of concerns he poses a threat to national security. A British immigration tribunal upheld the decision on Thursday in a ruling that revealed the Chinese national had developed such a close relationship with Andrew that he was invited to the prince’s birthday party. Government officials were concerned the man could have misused his influence because the prince was under “considerable pressure” at the time, according to the ruling. British authorities believe the Chinese national, whose name wasn’t released, was working on behalf of the United Front Work Department, an arm of the Chinese Communist Party that is used to influence foreign entities. The government determined that the businessman “was in a position to generate relationships between senior Chinese officials and prominent U.K. figures which could be leveraged for political interference purposes by the Chinese State,” according to the tribunal's decision. Prince Andrew, the younger brother of King Charles III, has been repeatedly criticized for his links to wealthy foreigners, raising concerns that those individuals are trying to buy access to the royal family. Andrew’s finances have been squeezed in recent years after he was forced to step away from royal duties and give up public funding amid concerns about his relationship with [Jeffrey Epstein](https://apnews.com/hub/jeffrey-epstein), the American financier and convicted pedophile who committed suicide in prison in 2019. British intelligence chiefs have become increasingly concerned about China’s efforts to influence U.K. government policy. In 2022, Britain’s domestic intelligence service, known as MI5, warned politicians that a British-Chinese lawyer [had been seeking to improperly influence members of Parliament](https://apnews.com/article/business-europe-china-london-00ec2b52530bdca7c42970e7759bbf85) for years. [A parliamentary researcher was arrested](https://apnews.com/article/uk-britain-china-spying-883477e073cc8e2b5623385c3a118d64) in 2023 on suspicion of providing sensitive information to China. The 50-year-old Chinese national covered by this week’s ruling was described as a man who worked as a junior civil servant in China before he came to the U.K. as a student in 2002. He earned a master’s degree in public administration and public policy at the University of York before starting a business that advises U.K.-based companies on their operations in China. He was granted the right to live and work in the U.K. for an indefinite period in 2013. Although he didn’t make Britain his permanent home, the man told authorities that he spent one to two weeks a month in the country and considered it his “second home.” He was stopped while entering the U.K. on Nov. 6, 2021, and ordered to surrender his mobile phone and other digital devices on which authorities found a letter from a senior adviser to Andrew confirming that he was authorized to act on behalf of the prince in relation to potential partners and investors in China. The letter and other documents highlighted the strength of the relationship between Andrew, his adviser and the Chinese national. “I also hope that it is clear to you where you sit with my principal and indeed his family,” the adviser wrote. “You should never underestimate the strength of that relationship. Outside of his closest internal confidants, you sit at the very top of a tree that many, many people would like to be on.” The letter went on to describe how they had found a way to work around former private secretaries to the prince and other people who weren’t completely trusted. “Under your guidance, we found a way to get the relevant people unnoticed in and out of the house in Windsor,” the adviser wrote. Andrew lives at the Royal Lodge, a historic country estate near Windsor Castle, west of London.

Getty Images China's United Front Work Department is an arm of the Communist Party The People's Republic of China has a "magic weapon", according to its founding leader Mao Zedong and its current president Xi Jinping. It is called the United Front Work Department - and it is raising as much alarm in the West as Beijing's growing military arsenal. Yang Tengbo, [a prominent businessman who has been linked to Prince Andrew](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyk2981l2wo), is the latest overseas Chinese citizen to be scrutinised - and sanctioned - for his links to the UFWD. The existence of the department is far from a secret. A decades-old and well-documented arm of the Chinese Communist Party, it has been mired in controversy before. Investigators from the US to Australia have cited the UFWD in multiple espionage cases, often accusing Beijing of using it for foreign interference. Beijing has denied all espionage allegations, calling them ludicrous. So what is the UFWD and what does it do? 'Controlling China's message' ----------------------------- The United Front - originally referring to a broad communist alliance - was once hailed by Mao as the key to the Communist Party's triumph in the decades-long Chinese Civil War. After the war ended in 1949 and the party began ruling China, United Front activities took a backseat to other priorities. But in the last decade under Xi, the United Front has seen a renaissance of sorts. Xi's version of the United Front is broadly consistent with earlier incarnations: to "build the broadest possible coalition with all social forces that are relevant", according to Mareike Ohlberg, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. On the face of it, the UFWD is not shadowy - it even has a website and reports many of its activities on it. But the extent of its work - and its reach - is less clear. While a large part of that work is domestic, Dr Ohlberg said, "a key target that has been defined for United Front work is overseas Chinese". Today, the UFWD seeks to influence public discussions about sensitive issues ranging from Taiwan - which China claims as its territory - to the suppression of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. It also tries to shape narratives about China in foreign media, target Chinese government critics abroad and co-opt influential overseas Chinese figures. "United Front work can include espionage but \[it\] is broader than espionage," Audrye Wong, assistant professor of politics at the University of Southern California, tells the BBC. "Beyond the act of acquiring covert information from a foreign government, United Front activities centre on the broader mobilisation of overseas Chinese," she said, adding that China is "unique in the scale and scope" of such influence activities. Reuters Xi Jinping has pushed for an assertive China abroad China has always had the ambition for such influence, but its rise in recent decades has given Beijing the ability to exercise it. Since Xi became president in 2012, he has been especially proactive in crafting [China's message to the world](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65247965), enouraging a confrontational ["wolf warrior"](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64218847) approach to diplomacy and urging his country's diaspora to "tell China's story well". The UFWD operates through various overseas Chinese community organisations, which have vigorously defended the Communist Party beyond its shores. They have censored anti-CCP artwork and protested at the activities of Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. The UFWD has also been linked to threats against members of persecuted minorities abroad, such as Tibetans and Uyghurs. But much of the UFWD's work overlaps with other party agencies, operating under what observers have described as "plausible deniability". It is this murkiness that is causing so much suspicion and apprehension about the UFWD. When Yang appealed against his ban from the UK amid espionage allegations, an immigration court ruled that he had downplayed his ties with the UFWD. UK officials allege he leveraged his relationships with influential British figures for Chinese state interference. Yang, however, maintains that he has not done anything unlawful and that the spy allegations are "entirely untrue". Supplied Mr Yang seen here with Prince Andrew Cases like Yang's are becoming increasingly common. In 2022, British Chinese lawyer Christine Lee was accused by the MI5 of acting through the UFWD to cultivate relationships with influential people in the UK. The following year, Liang Litang, a US citizen who ran a Chinese restaurant in Boston, was indicted for providing information about Chinese dissidents in the area to his contacts in the UFWD. And in September, Linda Sun, a former aide in the New York governor's office, was charged with using her position to serve Chinese government interests - receiving benefits, including travel, in return. According to Chinese state media reports, she had met a top UFWD official in 2017, who told her to "be an ambassador of Sino-American friendship". It is not uncommon for prominent and successful Chinese people to be associated with the party, whose approval they often need, especially in the business world. But where is the line between peddling influence and espionage? "The boundary between influence and espionage is blurry" when it comes to Beijing's operations, said Ho-fung Hung, a politics professor at Johns Hopkins University. This ambiguity has intensified after China passed a law in 2017 mandating Chinese nationals and companies to co-operate with intelligence probes, including sharing information with the Chinese government - a move that Dr Hung said "effectively turns everyone into potential spies". The Ministry of State Security has released dramatic propaganda videos warning the public that foreign spies are everywhere and "they are cunning and sneaky ". Some students who were sent on special trips abroad were told by their universities to limit contact with foreigners and were asked for a report of their activities on their return. And yet Xi is keen to promote China to the world. So he has tasked a trusted arm of the party to project strength abroad. And that is becoming a challenge for Western powers - how do they balance doing business with the world's second-largest economy alongside serious security concerns? Wrestling with the long arm of Beijing -------------------------------------- Genuine fears over China's overseas influence are playing into more hawkish sentiments in the West, often leaving governments in a dilemma. [Some, like Australia, have tried to protect themselves with fresh foreign interference laws](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-44624270) that criminalise individuals deemed to be meddling in domestic affairs. In 2020, the US imposed visa restrictions on people seen as active in UFWD activities. An irked Beijing has warned that such laws - and the prosecutions they have spurred - hinder bilateral relations. "The so-called allegations of Chinese espionage are utterly absurd," a foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters on Tuesday in response to a question about Yang. "The development of China-UK relations serves the common interests of both countries." Some experts say that the long arm of China's United Front is indeed concerning. "Western governments now need to be less naive about China's United Front work and take it as a serious threat not only to national security but also to the safety and freedom of many ethnic Chinese citizens," Dr Hung says. But, he adds, "governments also need to be vigilant against anti-Chinese racism and work hard to build trust and co-operation with ethnic Chinese communities in countering the threat together." Getty Images The UFWD has been accused of pressuring overseas dissidents and critics of the Communist Party Last December, Di Sanh Duong, a Vietnam-born ethnic Chinese community leader in Australia, was convicted of planning foreign interference for trying to cosy up to an Australian minister. Prosecutors argued that he was an "ideal target" for the UFWD because he had run for office in the 1990s and boasted ties with Chinese officials. Duong's trial had centred around what he meant when he said the inclusion of the minister at a charity event would be beneficial to "us Chinese" - did he mean the Chinese community in Australia, or mainland China? In the end, Duong's conviction - and a prison sentence - raised serious concerns that such broad anti-espionage laws and prosecutions can easily become [weapons for targeting ethnic Chinese people.](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-54595120) "It's important to remember that not everyone who is ethnically Chinese is a supporter of the Chinese Communist Party. And not everyone who is involved in these diaspora organisations is driven by fervent loyalty to China," Dr Wong says. "Overly aggressive policies based on racial profiling will only legitimise the Chinese government's propaganda that ethnic Chinese are not welcome and end up pushing diaspora communities further into Beijing's arms."

After joining the Chinese leader Xi Jinping for dinner last year, Mayor London Breed of San Francisco accompanied him to the airport to bid him farewell. There, on the tarmac, she made her request: pandas. Her city’s zoo was faltering. Tourism was suffering and she faced a tough re-election campaign. A pair of pandas from China would be a political and public relations win. What ensued were months of informal negotiations, with Ms. Breed — a politician with no foreign affairs or security experience — becoming a diplomat of sorts. She went to China, where she met the vice president and a deputy foreign minister, her calendars and emails show. She traveled with the editor of Sing Tao U.S., a pro-Beijing newspaper that registers as a foreign agent in the United States, according to other records and photographs from the trip. All of this was organized by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a group that American intelligence officials [have concluded](https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-national-association-for-chinas-peaceful-unification-nacpu-as-a-foreign-mission-of-the-prc/) seeks to “malignly influence” local leaders. Unlike traveling Washington politicians, Ms. Breed received no C.I.A. briefing about what counterintelligence threats she might face in China and how officials there might try to manipulate her. Mayor London Breed of San Francisco, left, and Wu Minglu, a Chinese wildlife conservation official, at a signing ceremony in Beijing in April to lease giant pandas to the American city.Credit...Liu Zheng/Associated Press If Ms. Breed wanted pandas, China had an interest in the meeting, too — as a way to cultivate a relationship with the mayor of one of America’s most technologically important cities. There is no evidence of any quid pro quo or wrongdoing, but intelligence officials say that China is increasingly looking to wield influence in local governments as its sway in Washington diminishes. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and [log into](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F19%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-influence-city-local-government-pandas-intelligence.html&asset=opttrunc) your Times account, or [subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F19%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-influence-city-local-government-pandas-intelligence.html) for all of The Times. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. Already a subscriber? [Log in](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F19%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-influence-city-local-government-pandas-intelligence.html&asset=opttrunc). Want all of The Times? [Subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F12%2F19%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-influence-city-local-government-pandas-intelligence.html).

There was talk of a high-speed rail line that China would build in Panama. A new subway line in Panama City. A modern container port. China has been working to build ties and influence in Panama for years, part of its broader ambition to expand its footprint in Latin America. The effort has had some successes, but also plenty of setbacks. In 2017, China scored a major victory when Panama cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its territory, and recognized Beijing instead. Panama had been one of the few countries worldwide to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. The following year, Panama became the first Latin American country to sign onto the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature global infrastructure program, which is aimed at enlarging China’s geopolitical heft and countering American influence. A flurry of ambitious promises followed. China proposed to build a 250-mile high-speed rail line from Panama City, the capital, toward the western border with Costa Rica. It offered to help build a new subway line in Panama City. A consortium of Chinese companies, led by the conglomerate Landbridge, began developing a container port that was promised to be Panama’s most modern one. A Chinese state-owned company also won a $1.4 billion contract to build a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal. Eventually, the two countries said they would negotiate a free-trade agreement. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and [log into](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F01%2F15%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-panama-explained.html&asset=opttrunc) your Times account, or [subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F01%2F15%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-panama-explained.html) for all of The Times. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. Already a subscriber? [Log in](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F01%2F15%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-panama-explained.html&asset=opttrunc). Want all of The Times? [Subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F01%2F15%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Fchina-panama-explained.html).

Unlock seamless, secure login experiences with [**Auth0**](https://auth0.com/signup?utm_source=sourceforge&utm_campaign=global_mult_mult_all_ciam-dev_dg-plg_auth0_display_sourceforge_banner_3p_PLG-SFSiteSearchBanner_utm2&utm_medium=cpc&utm_id=aNK4z000000UIV7GAO)—where authentication meets innovation. Scale your business confidently with flexible, developer-friendly tools built to protect your users and data. [**Try for FREE here**](https://auth0.com/signup?utm_source=sourceforge&utm_campaign=global_mult_mult_all_ciam-dev_dg-plg_auth0_display_sourceforge_banner_3p_PLG-SFSiteSearchBanner_utm2&utm_medium=cpc&utm_id=aNK4z000000UIV7GAO) × 175962313 story [](//tech.slashdot.org/index2.pl?fhfilter=social)[](//tech.slashdot.org/index2.pl?fhfilter=china) Posted by [BeauHD](https://www.linkedin.com/in/beauhd/) on Friday January 17, 2025 @06:20PM from the fate-loves-irony dept. Longtime Slashdot reader [tlhIngan](/~tlhIngan) writes: _In what is perhaps the greatest irony ever, the operators of RedNote (known as [Xiaohongshu](https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore)) have decided to "wall off" US TikTok refugees fleeing to its service as the [TikTok ban looms](https://news.slashdot.org/story/25/01/17/1518232/supreme-court-upholds-law-banning-tiktok-if-its-not-sold-by-its-chinese-parent-company). The reason? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [wants to prevent American influence from spreading to Chinese citizens](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2025/01/rednote-may-wall-off-tiktok-refugees-to-prevent-us-influence-on-chinese-users/). The ban is expected to be in place next week, while many believe that the [influx of Americans](https://tech.slashdot.org/story/25/01/15/0729235/tiktok-users-flocks-to-chinese-social-app-xiaohongshu) to be temporary and just a reaction to the TikTok ban to move to another Chinese app. Many Chinese users are not happy with the influx as having "ruined" their ability to connect with "Chinese culture, Chinese values and Chinese news."_

The Trump administration is targeting government officials who had been flagging foreign interference in U.S. elections, despite ongoing concerns that adversaries are stoking political and social divisions by spreading propaganda and disinformation online, current and former government officials said. The administration has already reassigned several dozen officials working on the issue at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and forced out others at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, part of the Department of Homeland Security, they said. The cuts have focused on people who were not only combating false content online but also working on broader safeguards to protect elections from cyberattacks or other attempts to disrupt voting systems. In last year’s election, the teams tracked and publicized numerous influence operations from Russia, China and Iran to blunt their impact on unsuspecting voters. Experts are alarmed that the cuts could leave the United States defenseless against covert foreign influence operations and embolden foreign adversaries seeking to [disrupt democratic governments](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/technology/election-interference-russia-china-iran.html). Arizona’s secretary of state, Adrian Fontes, a Democrat, warned in a letter to President Trump that the cuts were comparable to shutting down the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ahead of hurricane season. “This decision undermines Arizona’s election security,” he wrote, “at a time when our enemies around the world are using online tools to push their agendas and ideologies into our very homes.” Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and [log into](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F02%2F20%2Fbusiness%2Ftrump-foreign-influence-election-interference.html&asset=opttrunc) your Times account, or [subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F02%2F20%2Fbusiness%2Ftrump-foreign-influence-election-interference.html) for all of The Times. Thank you for your patience while we verify access. Already a subscriber? [Log in](https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?response_type=cookie&client_id=vi&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F02%2F20%2Fbusiness%2Ftrump-foreign-influence-election-interference.html&asset=opttrunc). Want all of The Times? [Subscribe](https://www.nytimes.com/subscription?campaignId=89WYR&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F02%2F20%2Fbusiness%2Ftrump-foreign-influence-election-interference.html).

 Chinese propagandists are using ChatGPT to write posts and comments on social media sites — and also to create performance reviews detailing that work for their bosses, according to OpenAI researchers. The use of the company's artificial intelligence chatbot to create internal documents, as well as by another Chinese operation to create marketing materials promoting its work, comes as China is ramping up its efforts to [influence opinion](https://www.npr.org/2024/05/30/g-s1-1670/openai-influence-operations-china-russia-israel) and conduct surveillance online. "What we're seeing from China is a growing range of covert operations using a growing range of tactics," Ben Nimmo, principal investigator on OpenAI's intelligence and investigations team, said on a call with reporters about the company's latest threat report. In the last three months, OpenAI says it disrupted 10 operations using its AI tools in malicious ways, and banned accounts connected to them. Four of the operations likely originated in China, the company said. The China-linked operations "targeted many different countries and topics, even including a strategy game. Some of them combined elements of influence operations, social engineering, surveillance. And they did work across multiple different platforms and websites," Nimmo said. One Chinese operation, which OpenAI dubbed "Sneer Review," used ChatGPT to generate short comments that were posted across TikTok, X, Reddit, Facebook, and other websites, in English, Chinese, and Urdu. Subjects included the Trump administration's dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development — with posts both praising and criticizing the move — as well as criticism of a Taiwanese game in which players work to defeat the Chinese Communist Party. In many cases, the operation generated a post as well as comments replying to it, behavior OpenAI's report said "appeared designed to create a false impression of organic engagement." The operation used ChatGPT to generate critical comments about the game, and then to write a long-form article claiming the game received widespread backlash. The actors behind Sneer Review also used OpenAI's tools to do internal work, including creating "a performance review describing, in detail, the steps taken to establish and run the operation," OpenAI said. "The social media behaviors we observed across the network closely mirrored the procedures described in this review." Another operation OpenAI tied to China focused on collecting intelligence by posing as journalists and geopolitical analysts. It used ChatGPT to write posts and biographies for accounts on X, to translate emails and messages from Chinese to English, and to analyze data. That included "correspondence addressed to a US Senator regarding the nomination of an Administration official," OpenAI said, but added that it was not able to independently confirm whether the correspondence was sent. "They also used our models to generate what looked like marketing materials," Nimmo said. In those, the operation claimed it conducted "fake social media campaigns and social engineering designed to recruit intelligence sources," which lined up with its online activity, OpenAI said in its report. In its [previous threat report](https://cdn.openai.com/threat-intelligence-reports/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-our-models-february-2025-update.pdf) in February, OpenAI identified a surveillance operation linked to China that claimed to monitor social media "to feed real-time reports about protests in the West to the Chinese security services." The operation used OpenAI's tools to debug code and write descriptions that could be used in sales pitches for the social media monitoring tool. In its new report published on Wednesday, OpenAI said it had also disrupted covert influence operations likely originating in [Russia](https://www.npr.org/2024/09/23/nx-s1-5123927/russia-artificial-intelligence-election) and [Iran](https://www.npr.org/2024/11/09/nx-s1-5181965/2024-election-foreign-influence-russia-china-iran), a spam operation attributed to a commercial marketing company in the Philippines, a recruitment scam linked to Cambodia, and a deceptive employment campaign bearing the hallmarks of operations connected to North Korea. "It is worth acknowledging the sheer range and variety of tactics and platforms that these operations use, all of them put together," Nimmo said. However, he said the operations were largely disrupted in their early stages and didn't reach large audiences of real people. "We didn't generally see these operations getting more engagement because of their use of AI," Nimmo said. "For these operations, better tools don't necessarily mean better outcomes." _Do you have information about foreign influence operations and AI? Reach out to_ [_Shannon Bond_](https://www.npr.org/people/763523701/shannon-bond) _through encrypted communications on Signal at shannonbond.01_